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The recent proliferation of unilateral sanctions (i.e. sanctions imposed outside the multilateral framework of the United 
Nations), constitutes one of the most notable developments in the practice of sanctions over the last few decades1. According 
to the Targeted Sanctions Consortium database (TSC), in 2013 almost ninety percent of UN sanctions episodes were 
accompanied by unilateral sanctions, also, more than two third of UN sanctions were simultaneously applied with sanctions 
imposed by regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). Interestingly, sanctions 
imposed by the EU represented more than half of all sanctions imposed by regional bodies. On the other side, more than 
sixty percent of all unilateral sanctions applied by individual states were uniquely imposed by the USA2. One possible 
explanation of this phenomenon may relate to the question of legitimacy. This paper underlines the legitimacy of sanctions 
imposed by the Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as it is perceived by regional organizations 
and individual states. It examines the way regional organizations understand legitimacy and how such understanding affects 
their actions. It also underlines the impact of concerns about legitimacy of multilateral sanctions on their effectiveness 
and on the behavior of individual states. Before proceeding, it is necessary to note that the nexus between legitimacy and 
Table of contents
1. Introduction
　1.1.  The dichotomy multilateral-unilateral sanctions
　1.2.  Conceptual intractability of legitimacy 
　1.3.  Proposed definition of legitimacy
　1.4.  Historical overview of the legitimacy of UN sanctions
　1.5.  The difference between the legitimacy of IOs and the legitimacy of states
2. Sanctions legitimacy and the quest of ‘legality’: the case of regional organizations
　2.1.  Regional organizations are “guardians” of the UN sanctions: the case of the EU
　2.2.  Regional organizations use UN sanctions to legitimize and delegitimize unilateral sanctions
　2.2.1.  UN sanctions’ legitimacy as a threshold for the use of sanctions in IR
　2.2.2.  UN sanctions’ legitimacy as a ceiling on the use of sanctions in IR
3. Sanctions legitimacy and the quest of effectiveness: the case of individual states
　3.1.  Ineffective sanctions are deemed illegitimate 
　3.2.  The proliferation of unilateral sanctions: the case of the US
　　3.2.1.  The shift of the US foreign policy toward unilateralism
　　3.2.2.  The Shift in the political rhetoric vis-à-vis UN sanctions
4. Centralized sanction, decentralized sanctions and the World Order 
　4.1.  The centralization of the use of force in the post-World War Order  
　4.2.  The decentralization of the recourse to sanctions in international relations




effectiveness of sanctions is systematically invoked by both academics and practitioners. Inter Alia, a recent study conducted 
by the UN University (Cockayne, Brubaker and Jayakody 2018) stressed the relationship between the ongoing wave of 
judicial processes against UN sanctions and the legitimacy and effectiveness of such sanctions. It argued that the ongoing 
wave of challenging the legitimacy of UN sanctions in domestic and regional courts for respect of due process requirements 
is not only a question of legitimacy but also of effectiveness3. Similarly, in a letter addressed to the Council, the UN 
Ombudsperson to the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee asserted that the effectiveness of UN sanctions is contingent 
upon the availability of requirements related to due process standards (particularly, impartiality and independence), that such 
requirements are necessary to secure the cooperation of member states precisely because they ‘strengthen the effectiveness” 
and it provides a “guarantee” to the states who care about upholding the rule of law, that those measures are both necessary 
and fair’4. Equally, Daugirdas suggests that legitimacy and effectiveness are tightly linked and that the very existence of 
international organizations (IOs) may be threatened if their legitimacy, and thus effectiveness, are hampered: “[l] egitimacy 
and effectiveness of IOs are tightly linked because IOs depend on voluntary state cooperation and state financial support 
to carry out their decisions and operations. Unless they are perceived as legitimate, IOs will have a difficult time securing 
either one. IOs that are less effective because they are perceived to be illegitimate will be less useful to their member states 
and may even risk being shut down”5 (Daugirdas 2014, 1007).
At this level, it is important to define the relevant concepts used in this paper, including the distinction between unilateral 
and multilateral sanctions and the concept of legitimacy, as well as the different historical phases during which the legitimacy 
of UN sanctions was under scrutiny.
　1.1  The dichotomy multilateral-unilateral sanctions
In legal theory sanctions are defined as a “reaction to illegality”, i.e. a reaction to a violation of an established legal 
obligation (Tzanakopoulos 2015, 147). This definition is applicable in both the national and international legal order. The 
Austrian legal and political philosopher Hans Kelsen wrote: “the consequence that attaches by law to wrongful conduct—
and conversely, wrongful conduct is the legal condition for the imposition of a sanction”. Similarly, the Report of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session (2001) refers to sanctions as a “reaction to 
illegality” that may be unilateral (decentralized) or collective (centralized)6. Indeed, unlike national law, international 
law provides a further distinction between two types of sanctions: unilateral and multilateral sanctions. On the one hand, 
this distinction has a normative rather than a descriptive foundation. According to Orakhelashvili, the determination of 
what is unilateral and what is multilateral is provided by the legal system and does not depend on the characteristics of 
sanctions (e.g. the scope or the number of actors involved in the decision-making process). This is, for instance, the case 
of sanctions imposed by the European Union defined as unilateral measures regardless of the fact that they are taken 
collectively (Orakhelashvili 2015, 4)7. On the other hand, they have different legal foundations. As for multilateral sanctions, 
Carisch et al. asserted that the UN Charter endowed the UNSC with the exclusive legal authority to use “globally binding 
sanctions” in order to maintain and restore international peace and security. They define multilateral sanctions as “coercive 
policies” deployed by the UN in order to “reinforce internationally accepted norms of peace and security, usually enshrined 
in international law”8. While for unilateral sanctions, Article 48 of the ILC Articles on The Responsibility of States 
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for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) is considered to be their legal foundation (Carisch et al. 2017)9. Pellet (2015) 
identified four criteria to distinguish unilateral sanctions from potentially similar measures. Firstly, they are “lawful coercive 
reactions” taken as a response to an “internationally wrongful act”. Secondly, they may only be triggered as a reaction to 
a “grave violation” of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). Thirdly, they are distinguished from classical 
countermeasures (a.k.a. reprisals), in that they are not a reaction to “a previous breach in the interest of particular States”. 
Fourthly and finally, the sender state or organization do not need to be harmed by this violation, because it acts in the name 
of and for the interest of the international community as a whole10.
　1.2  Conceptual intractability of legitimacy 
P. Jan Klabbers once wrote: ‘[i]t has long been recognized by international lawyers of a more or less critical bent 
that one of the ways international law can be considered useful (...) is that it provides a vocabulary for discussing things. 
Rules on use of force and self-defense may not solve conflicts, but provide a language (and often enough the most relevant 
language) for discussing the use of force. Rules on international trade may not solve trade conflicts, but help provide the 
relevant actors with a language in which to discuss whether tuna caught by means of driftnet fishing should be banned from 
markets or not’11. In the same way, for many scholars legitimacy is regarded as an intractable and problematic concept, yet 
warts and all, it does provide a basis for understanding things and explaining various social and political phenomena both at 
the national and international level. To discern the concept of legitimacy we need to distinguish/ decouple it from concepts 
that may generate confusion in the mind of the reader. 
Firstly, we need to distinguish legitimacy from legality and clarify the link between the two concepts. Legal scholar 
Kristina Daugirdas  differentiated between “sociological legitimacy” and legality. Sociological legitimacy refers to the 
“perception” that the IO is legitimate, while legality refers to the perception that the IO is acting in compliance with its 
international obligations12. Put differently, it is possible to separate legitimacy and legality. This was for example the case of 
NATO’s military operation in Kosovo (1999) which was explicitly qualified by the Independent International Commission 
on Kosovo as an “illegal but legitimate act”13. Nevertheless, that was the only case in recent history where the legitimacy 
of an act made by an international organization was admitted though its legality was precluded. That’s why many scholars, 
especially neoliberal institutionalists such as Grant and Keohane (2005) and Buchanan and Keohane (2006) admit that 
legitimacy and legality are often coupled in the sense that IO’s legitimacy “depends in part” on its legality (Daugirdas 
2014, 1007)14. In a similar fashion, international lawyers admit that legality and legitimacy “do not always coincide”, and 
that distinction between the two concepts lies within the sense that the subject may give to legitimacy15. Pellet argued that 
the relation between legitimacy and legality is reciprocal and goes in both ways16. On the one hand, rules of law will only 
appear, and be seen, as lawful when they are legitimate. On the other hand, legality is part of the legitimization process, that 
is, behaviors which are in conformity with legal rules are seen as legitimate, while those which are unlawful will appear 
to be illegitimate. So generally talking, the legality of a given behavior guarantees its acceptance as legitimate in most of 
the cases (Pellet 2008, 729). To recapitulate, legitimacy and justice are two different things that may exist separately, yet 
they have areas of intersection. In fact, while legitimacy is a subjective belief17, such belief is partly contingent upon the 
conformity of that rule or institution with the agreed-upon standards and laws18. 
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Secondly, legitimacy needs to be separated from fairness, justice and morality. Unlike Franck (1993)19, Pellet argued 
that fairness and legitimacy are connected because fairness of the procedure or its outcomes may be part of the legitimacy 
of any given rule and action, but both concepts must be treated as two different concepts (Pellet 2008)20. Similarly, many 
scholars agree that the concept of legitimacy shall be differentiated from that of justice. For instance, Buchanan and Keohane 
argue that such confusion between the two concepts in the international area may lead to undermining what they called “the 
valuable social function of legitimacy assessments”21. They suggest two reasons to support their argument: on the one hand, 
the absence of a consensus on what could be considered as a just standard conditioning the acquisition of legitimacy. On 
the other hand, even if it is possible to maintain a consensus on what justice requires, the consequences of not meeting such 
standard would be “self-defeating from the stand-point of justice itself” because such consequences would undermine the 
effectiveness of international institutions, while adversely, justice shall not be maintained without effectiveness (Buchanan 
and Keohane 2009, 412)22. Finally, it is necessary to separate legitimacy from morality. In one sense, morality is used as 
a “counterpart to justice”. In a different context, it refers to the “conformity to certain people’s habits” (i.e. to what they 
consider as a common sense). In this latter sense, morality has a merely “descriptive” function, and moral issues “may be 
simply those issues that have been publicized and many people have developed some sensitivities towards them but may not 
have anything to do with the sense/criterion of justice”23. In brief, this study maintains the argument of P. Hurd who argued 
that the debate over the legitimacy of the decisions and acts made by the SC says nothing about their justness (Hurd 2008, 
113)24.
　1.3.  Proposed definition of legitimacy
The legitimacy of an international organization is a subject-oriented phenomenon and not an objective criterion. It 
refers to the “belief that a rule or an institution deserves the actor’s deference and ought to be respected”. This belief 
is partly dependent on the conformity with established norms and with the agreed-upon standards of international 
law. Also, legitimacy is a continuous phenomenon that is crystallized through a continuous processes of legitimation 
and delegitimation. Finally, the distinction between input legitimacy (i.e. the content of the norm and the procedure of 
elaboration), and output legitimacy (i.e. the effectiveness of the norm in attending its stated goal), may be useful in capturing 
the way actors question the legitimacy of acts and decisions made by the UN.
Firstly, Hurd  conceptualized legitimacy as “a subjective belief that an institution or a rule ought to be respected and 
deserves the actors’ deference”. Hurd’s conceptualization has traces in the work of Jürgen Habermas, precisely in chapter 
five of his book Communication and the Evolution of Society where he unfolded Legitimation Problems that are faced by 
modern states25. It has also traces in the definition provided by American sociologist Mark Suchman according to which 
legitimacy is a “generalized perception of or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Hurd 2008, 25)26. In this sense, 
generalized refers to the idea that legitimacy is an “umbrella evaluation\” that is resilient to certain acts and occurrences, 
and that also depends on a given historical process. It reflects the perception/assumption that the audience has vis-à-vis the 
institution or the rule. So, while legitimacy is “possessed objectively”, it is “created subjectively”. Finally, legitimacy is 
a socially constructed phenomenon, because it depends on collective audience but remains independent from individual 
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observers27. Hence, subjectivity is an important aspect that is central to the understanding of legitimacy. Hurd, accentuated 
the idea that legitimacy is a “necessarily subjective”28 and could by no means be an objective concept, otherwise it would 
be void of meaning, analytically irrelevant and even confusing29. So, for the purpose of this paper, the emphasis on the 
“subjective character of legitimacy” is vital, and that means that no distinction is made between saying that a rule or an 
institution is “legitimate”, and saying that such rule or institution is considered to be legitimate (Weber 1978). Also, unlike 
psychologists such as Richard Sennett (1980) who distinguished between the “psychological process” (i.e. the perception 
that an organization is legitimate), and the “authoritarian process” (i.e. the internal feeling of being compelled to obey), 
in political science, both processes are generally understood as being the same thing30. Practically talking, if a state or a 
regional organization thinks that the UN is legitimate, it means that they believe that UN rules and institutions ought to be 
obeyed and that they are supposed to fashion their acts in accordance with the constraints of such rules or institutions. Yet, 
subjectivity means also that legitimacy is conceived differently depending on the actors involved, and on the political setting. 
Also, strategies and processes of legitimation will differ depending on the change in the issues at stake, interests and the 
types of political power involved (Hurd 2008, 33-34)31. 
Secondly, the conformity to international law is one fundamental aspect of legitimacy. In the case of UN sanctions, 
saying that legitimacy is a subjective belief does not preclude the idea that such belief is partly contingent upon the 
compliance with international law and the respect of international obligations of the organization. As it is noted above, 
legitimacy and compliance with international law are often coupled, because the belief that the decision or the act of the IO 
is legitimate depends in part on the respect of its international obligations. Evidence of such relation may be found in the 
language used by many authors, experts in UN sanctions and even political and judicial authorities. Inter alia, Cockayne, 
Brubaker and Jayakody made a clear connection between the legitimacy of UN sanctions regimes and the respect of the 
established norms and standards of international law. They argued that legal challenges against UN listing decisions played 
central role in disrupting the legitimacy of UN sanctions and that legitimacy UN sanctions is closely related to the respect of 
international standards (especially due process and human rights) (Cockayne et al. 2018)32.
Thirdly, the phenomenon of legitimacy is a dynamic and continuous phenomenon that is crystallized through smaller 
processes of legitimation and delegitimation.  American sociologist Mark C. Suchman, provided a useful conceptualization 
for those processes. For instance, he identified three primary forms of organizational legitimacy that may feed the process 
of legitimation: pragmatic (based on audience’s interest), moral (based on normative approval), and cognitive (based on 
comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness) (Suchman 1995, 577-584)33. 
Fourthly and finally, to distinguish the stance of international organizations from that of individual states towards 
the legitimacy of UNSC’s sanctions, the conceptualization of German political scientist Fritz Scharpf, might be quite 
useful. Scharpf distinguished between input legitimacy and output legitimacy. While the former refers to elements such as 
“democracy, transparency in decision-making, and their law-abiding nature”, the latter is derived from the “actual work 
that actors do”34. In other words, it is a distinction between the respect of international law and international standards 
(e.g. during the decision-making process) on the one hand, and the effectiveness of sanctions in maintaining their intended 
objective on the other hand (Schmidt) 35. 
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　1.4.   Historical overview of the legitimacy of UN sanctions
Over the years, the debate over legitimacy has direct effect on the actual enforcement of sanctions and on the UN 
practice in general36. As it is maintained in the seminal study of Mary O’Connell, many phases of contestations might 
be identified basing on the way legitimacy was perceived over time and by different actors. The first phase (1965-1990), 
concerned the case of Southern Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977) and could be called the phase of the “ultra vires 
argument”.  During this phase the question of legitimacy was basically about whether the UNSC is lawfully entitled to take 
sanctions under the provisions of the Charter or not. For O'Connell (2002), such debate ended with a “general consensus” 
that the UNSC has broad discretionary power to decide when and where to impose “comprehensive and air-tight” sanctions. 
At that time, it was argued that the situations in place did not fall within the wording of the Charter (the Charter explicitly 
allows the use of sanctions in three cases: breaches of the peace, threats to the peace and acts of aggression), and that the SC 
was acting “ultra vires the Charter” by sanctioning the “white-supremacist” regime of Ian smith or the apartheid regime in 
South Africa. In this first case, the authority to sanction was justified based on the need to ensure “peaceful transition from 
colony to an independent democratic state" (Southern Rhodesia) and on the basis of grave violations of human rights (South 
Africa). In the early 90s, the ultra vires debate was replaced by a debate over the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their 
stated goal37. The second phase (1990-2000) was triggered due to the “inhuman impact” of sanctions against Iraq (1990) and 
Haiti (1993). According to O’Connell (2002), the debate during this phase was mainly about limiting the power of the SC to 
use sanctions precisely basing on concerns related to humanitarian law and human rights law. At the time the SC sanctions 
were called “sanctions of mass destruction” and the UN was accused of “genocide”. Hence, the issue at stake was to engage 
the international responsibility of SC for violation of international law, and the main question was about “when” and “how” 
the power of the SC should be limited38. By the end of this phase, the UN practice turned to the use of “targeted sanctions” 
(a.k.a smart sanction) and abandoned the use of “comprehensive (i.e. indiscriminate) sanctions” (O’Connell 2002)39. 
Finally, the third phase (2000-today) may be called the phase of the due process debate. During this phase, the question of 
legitimacy of UN targeted sanctions was associated with the respect of the target’s right to a fair trial and the respect of 
international standards of due process. The Kadi Judgement (European Court of Justice 2008) is considered a landmark 
decision due to its “significant practical impact” on the use and practice of UN sanctions40. In that judgement, the Court held 
that the right of individuals to a fair trial and its various aspects (right to access to a court, access to an effective remedy and 
right to be heard) is already enshrined in international law (e.g. in International Convention of Civil and Political Rights) and 
in customary international law41, and that the SC’ listing decisions (precisely in the context of Counter-terrorism) violated 
such rights. As a result, states’ implementations measures were declared invalid, members of the European Union were asked 
not to enforce UN sanctions until the SC provides sufficient guarantees for the target entities and individuals42, the number of 
judicial challenges against the SC sanctions increased dramatically, and the effectiveness of UN sanctions was considerably 
jeopardized. As a reaction the UNSC, made multiple reforms, yet, recent studies proved that such reforms are not enough, 
and that both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of UN sanctions- especially in contexts other than counter-terrorism are 
highly vulnerable and seriously threatened by potential and ongoing legal challenges43. 
At this level, it is necessary to note that this paper will answer the following questions: how do states and regional 
organizations comprehend the legitimacy of UNSC sanctions? And how could such understanding of the legitimacy UN 
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sanctions relate to the proliferation of unilateral sanctions?  To answer these questions, the second paragraph of this study 
will focus on the way regional organizations understand the legitimacy of the SC’s sanctions. While the third paragraph 
will concentrate on the stance of individual states especially the United States of America which is by far the first sender 
of economic sanctions outside the UN framework. Paragraph four will underline the effect of the proliferation of unilateral 
sanctions (by both states and regional organizations) on the meta-level (i.e. the world order). And the fifth and last paragraph 
will be the conclusion. However, before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the distinction between the legitimacy of 
individual states and that of international organizations.
　1.5.   The difference between the legitimacy of IOs and the legitimacy of states
For Hurd (2008), legitimacy is a central preoccupation not only for international organizations (be they universal 
like the UN or regional like the EU) but also for states, yet they approach it in different ways. On the one hand, we can 
comprehend the legitimacy of IOs by drawing an analogy between them and Supreme Courts in national orders (Hurd 2019). 
Like supreme courts, IOs have a political authority in the domestic constituencies in which they are established, however, 
they lack the operational capacity to enforce their decisions directly. In other words, both IOs and supreme courts rely 
tremendously on legitimacy more than anything else because they lack the “coercive enforcement capacity to back up its 
decisions”, and because the compliance of their subordinates may only be “voluntary and consensual”44.  In the same line of 
argument, Tzanakopoulos asserted that wording of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
suggests that the UN does not control the conduct of member states in fact (a factual control), but it does control them in 
law (normative control). That is, in order to enforce its own decisions, the UNSC needs state organs to adopt a “course of 
action or to achieve a specific result”. This also means that, unlike states who do not have the right (under international law) 
to exercise normative control over others states, the adverse is true for IOs who function only through the normative control 
over states (Tzanakopoulos 2013)45. Daugirdas explained the idea differently using the concept of reputation. She argued that 
having the reputation of being in compliance with international law constitutes an important facet of an IO’s legitimacy. That 
is, when the organization is perceived to be legitimate, that would allow for the cooperation and the supports of its members 
and would consequently lead to the enforcement of its acts and decisions: “[t] he perception that an IO is legitimate is, 
in turn, crucial to the organization’s ability to secure cooperation and support from its member states (...) IOs and their 
member states will take action to prevent and address violations of international law in order to deflect threats to IOs’ 
reputation – and to preserve their effectiveness” (Daugirdas 2014, 993)46. In similar context, Keohane and Buchanan wrote 
the following: “The perception of legitimacy matters, because in a democratic era, multilateral institutions will only thrive if 
they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics”. Thus, if the support for global governance institutions is undermined, 
its effectiveness will be impaired (Keohane and Buchanan 2006, 407)47. On the other side, certainly the existence of states 
does not really depend on the legitimacy of their acts much less on their reputation. Having said that, it is also certain that a 
reputation that the state is not violating international law may remain at stake in certain cases. For instance, the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 was a clear violation of international law and precisely of the general rule of the prohibition of the use of armed 
force in international relations48. But before proceeding, the UK and the US made several attempts to obtain a permission 
from the council and failed with explicit opposition from France, Russia and China49. And even following the invasion, the 




　2. Sanctions legitimacy and the quest of ‘legality’: the case of regional organizations
In this part, legality is broadly understood as equivalent to the conformity to international law and to the agreed-
upon international standards. It is argued that regional organizations take the legitimacy the UNSC sanctions for granted. 
Nevertheless, saying that regional organizations consider that the UN sanctions are legitimate does not preclude the idea that 
such organizations are simultaneously pursuing their interests. It is thus argued that concerns related to the legitimacy of UN 
sanctions were decisive in influencing the use of sanctions outside the organizational framework of the UN (i.e. unilateral 
sanctions) 
　2.1.  Regional organizations are “guardians” of the UN sanctions: the case of the EU
Legitimacy is crystallized through the “internalization of external standards”51. Saying that an actor internalized certain 
external standards means that his perception of what constitutes an interest for him, is “partly constituted” by an external 
force. In IR, such force comes from standards, laws, rules, and norms established within the international community52. 
Accordingly, it is a matter of fact that member states of the EU-who are in the same time member states of the UN- take 
for granted the legitimacy of the UNSC authority to impose sanctions in order to respond to threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression in international relations as it was connoted in the UN Charter (this issue was presumably 
resolved following the above-mentioned “ultra vires debate”). Hurd  argued that the “process of legitimation” of the UN in 
general and of the SC in specific, is a “continuous historical processs” that started amid the second World War and that is 
still enduring with the different calls to reform the Council such as the wave of reform proposals (especially those raised in 
the 50s anniversary of the UN and those raised following the invasion of Iraq)53. He argued that the UNSC acquires power 
when its action is deemed legitimate by different audiences, and vice versa. Thus, if the Council’s act is seen illegitimate its 
power will diminish. In the same line of argumentation, American scholar Inis L. Claude Jr. (1966) stressed the collective 
aspect of legitimacy. He suggested the concept of “collective legitimation” to denote the social dimension of the Council’s 
authority over international relations. For Claude, member states perceived the Council as being legitimate, and thus, it is 
both acceptable and correct to follow its decisions54. For instance, the 1960s’ Council was endowed with notable power 
because its actions were perceived as a crystallization of the views of the majority of the countries in the world: “[t]he 
Council was authorized to speak and act on behalf of the global community, and thus its utterances and behavior carried 
more force than had they been carried out by individual Council members” (Hurd 2008, 7)55
Nonetheless, admitting the legitimacy of the UNSC decisions to take restrictive measures under chapter VII is not 
everything. International actors may admit the legitimacy of the UNSC to take restrictive measures not involving the use of 
armed force, but may still contest the legitimacy of its decisions on a case-by-case basis. According to Suchman, legitimacy 
refers to the collective acceptance and support of a given “pattern of behavior” regardless of the existence of an isolated 
reservation or skepticism toward a specific behavior: “when one says that a certain pattern of behavior possesses legitimacy, 
one asserts that some group of observers, as a whole, accepts or supports what those observers perceive to be the behavioral 
pattern as a whole—despite reservations that any single observer might have about any single behavior, and despite 
reservations that any or all observers might have, were they to observe more”. Indeed, in many instances, particular UNSC’ 
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sanctions were under scrutiny for violating fundamental international standards such as the rule of law, the supremacy of 
Human Rights and the inderogeability of jus cogens. If anything, this proves that legitimacy is a continuous process and that 
internalization of the norm involves also a certain kind of control by those who believe in such rule or institution. This idea 
goes in line with Hurd’s assumption that legitimacy is a “relational social phenomenon”56. For Hurd, the perception of the 
actor that a rule or a decision ought to be respected, is not arbitrary but is generally stemming from two sources. The first 
is the “substance of the norm” itself. The second is “the procedure” by which it was constituted57. Also, Franck asserted 
that legitimacy of international rules is “a property of a rule or ruler-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward 
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addresses believe that the rule or institution has come into being 
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process” (Franck 1990). The following paragraph 
highlights the way the EU approaches to ensure the conformity of the UNSC sanctions decisions with the agreed-upon 
standards of international law.  
In general, states acting in concert through their regional organizations are pictured as “implementers” of UN sanctions58, 
but rarely portrayed as strong “guardians” of the legitimacy of such sanctions59. This paragraph argues that regional 
organizations are double-hatted actors who play both roles simultaneously (implementers and guardians). One the one 
hand, the legitimacy of certain sanctions decisions was under question during the process of the implementation of UN 
sanctions by member states (articles 25 and 41 of the Charter). On the other hand, while individual states may not make 
much difference, collective action by members of regional organizations which are at the same time members of the UN, 
proved to be highly effective and to trigger considerable change in the SC’ approach to the use of sanctions. Having said 
that, contesting the legitimacy of a given sanctions regime or sanction decision, does not preclude the overall belief that the 
UNSC action under Chapter VII of the Charter is legitimate. 
Two case are worth noting here, the first one is the case of UN sanctions against Libya in the 90s following the 
Lockerbie Affair (Pan Am Flight 103) when the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) and the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (now Organization of Islamic Cooperation) played fundamental role in contesting the legitimacy 
of such sanctions and in influencing the SC‘s approach. The second case is the ongoing tendency of political and judicial 
organs of the European Union (EU) to contest and preclude the legitimacy of certain UN listing decisions for violations of 
human rights and other international standards. Firstly, in the case of Libya, it was widely accepted at that time that the UN 
was reluctant to respond to repeated calls to lift sanctions even after the compliance of Libya and its readiness to negotiate. 
Tzanakopoulos  argued that, at a certain point, despite the compliance of Libya and its readiness to come to the table of 
negotiation, the UN Security Council was reluctant to respond and refused to lift the sanctions. Consequently, member states 
of the Organization of African Unity and member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference had argued that the 
Council’s continuation of measures against Libya constituted a violation of freedom of religion, and a violation of Chapter 
VII of the charter because the behavior of Libya was no longer a real threat to the peace (Tzanakopoulos 2013, 78)60. In 
June 1998, the Organization of African Union adopted a Resolution proclaiming the illegality of the sanction regime against 
Libya and precluding compliance with such regime61, and because the arguments made in this case were well heeded among 
multiple actors of the international community, the SC’s had to end the sanction regime in order to “deflect the challenge to 
its legitimacy” (Daugirdas 2014, 1014)62.  
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Recently, sanctions decisions are being evaluated for respect of the due process standards, particularly in accordance 
with sanctions listing and delisting procedures, whether they guarantee the rights of the target entities and individuals and 
whether they are conforming to the agreed-upon standards. Since 2008, judicial organs such as the European Court of Justice 
and the European Court of Human Rights (as well as other national courts in different parts of the world) started accepting 
judicial challenges against UN sanctions made by individuals and legal entities accused of terrorism (before 2008 courts 
were routinely dismissing such challenges to avoid the violation of IOs immunities). Seminal decisions mostly by domestic 
European courts, concluded that the rights and freedoms of target individuals and entities were critically violated by UN 
sanctions without having the possibility to seek redress. Successful challenges had typically two consequences, holding 
the state responsible for violating international law obligations and/or declaring the regulation aimed at implementing the 
SC’s as invalid. More practically, the final outcome was that concerned states could not implement the SC decisions, and 
that has two legal consequences: triggering those states’ international obligation for non-compliance with articles 25, 103 
and 41 of the Charter which require them to obey and implement the decisions made by the SC; or seeking to trigger the 
international responsibility of the UN for breach of its own international obligations. Ultimately, States members of the 
EU choose to disobey the Council and to act in concert through their regional organizations in order to put pressure on the 
Council to reform sanctions regime in a manner that meets the UN’s international obligations63. Indeed, the effectiveness and 
precisely the universal implementation of UN sanctions were critically jeopardized since 2008 with the Kadi v. Council & 
Commission judgement (2008), because that decision triggered a tide of legal challenges in domestic and regional courts by 
individuals and entities subject to the SC sanctions. 
Finally, it is important to note that this phenomenon is still ongoing, in fact, between 2002 and 2017, a total number of 
47 legal challenges were brought against the UN sanctions in 12 different national and regional jurisdictions (inter alia, in 
Belgium, Pakistan, Canada, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, and even in the United States), they 
were mostly related to the context of counter-terrorism and some of them were related to the armed conflicts in Congo, 
Central African Republic, and Iraq. It is also worth noting that the council reaction to this predicament was limited to the 
establishment of the mechanism of Focal Points (2006) and the Office of the Ombudsman (2009), yet, both were insufficient 
and did not succeed to contain the increasing number of judicial processes64. For example, Thouvenin argued that the UN 
sanctions are lacking the “complete legitimacy they should deserve”. For instance, challenges against the UN sanctions, 
such as the Nada decision (12 September 2012) and the above-mentioned Kadi decision (European Court of Justice and 
the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland), demonstrated that the SC reforms are still wanting and fall short of the “basic 
human rights requirements” particularly in relation to guarantees of “effective judicial protection”. Moreover, the “UN 
political bodies face inherent difficulties to respect spontaneously’ human rights”. He also asserted that most of the reforms 
that the SC made to its listing and delisting approach were actually forced by the pressure made by judicial organs, civil 
society65 (Thouvenin 2015, 125-128), instead of being the result of a genuine political will to preserve and protect human 
rights from the part of the council.
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　2.2.  Regional organizations use UN sanctions to legitimize and delegitimize unilateral sanctions
Understanding legitimacy as a subjective belief, an internalized conviction, means that such belief has a direct effect on 
the actor’s behavior, precisely on his strategic calculation of costs and benefits, and on the way he will respond to a given 
institution or rule. On the other side, maintaining that a rule or institution is legitimate and ought to be respected, generates 
an “internal sense of rightness and obligation”66 among those to whom it is addressed, but does not preclude the fact 
that the actor is pursuing his interest within this framework. On the contrary, a legitimate rule is one that is “behaviorally 
significant”, and that means that an actor who held a rule as being legitimate, is one who “reconfigures” his interest 
according to the content of that rule (Hurd, 2008, 31)67. This idea can be traced even in the Weberian conceptualization 
of legitimacy (a.k.a the belief theory of legitimacy). Indeed, some scholars have eloquently argued that the utilitarian 
assumption that actors’ actions are intended to pursue a particular interest is not totally excluded by Weber. Merquior, 
rejected the interpretation according to which the Weberian theory of legitimacy separated actions guided by self-interest 
from those driven by legitimacy (i.e. drawing a neat distinction between the “legitimizing behavior” and “utilitarian 
motivations”). This view assumed that Weber did not recognize utilitarian motives as a source of legitimacy and that his 
social theory remains at the “purely normative level” of the social order. It assumed that for Weber, it is the “sense of duty, 
voluntary submission”, and “genuine acceptance, of a given power-order”, as opposed to pure self-interest or fear68 (this 
understanding of legitimacy is influenced by the work of Talcott Parson). Contrary, Merquior, as well as other scholars such 
as Cohen, Hazelrigg, Pope (1975)69, argued that the mainstream of social studies minimized and even blinded the fact that 
Weber himself accentuated the role of rational calculation and the pursuit of self-interests to generate compliance. He argued 
that Weber did not deny or exclude the “ability of utilitarian motives to sustain validity of social order”, but was rather 
reluctant in acknowledging that such motives may be a source of validity (Merquior 1980, 93-95)70. 
In the same line of argument, Hurd (2008), stressed the necessity to differentiate between the concept of interest and 
that of self-interest. He argued that a social order that is founded on legitimacy -be it national or international- is different 
from social orders created through coercion or governed by self-interest. Bearing on the theory of Wendt who provided 
an eloquent distinction between interest and pure self-interest71, Hurd emphasized on the importance of distinguishing the 
concept of interest which refers to the choice of means that are presumed to accomplish the desired goals, the concept of 
self-interest or “self-interestedness” refers to a purely “instrumental attitude” toward the rules and toward other actors72. In 
International relations, the idea of self-interest is routinely invoked by rationalists who assume that states are egoistic entities 
pursuing their own national interests; this argument is mainly justified by the “violent history of international politics”. For 
instance, Waltz asserted that at the very beginning, the current international system was created by “self-regarding” states, 
similarly, for Sondermann what drives the action of states in international relations is their national egoism, while for George 
and Keohane, self-interest is the “core of national interest” (Wendt 1999, 239)73.  
Like Hurd, Wendt, argued that interest is a “generic term” that connotes the choice of means made by actors for the 
sake of achieving a desired goal. This term is generic because it might be found in different kinds of social orders: in a 
coercion-based order, a self-interest-based or a legitimacy-based order, all actors have interests in the sense that they all 
chose means in order to achieve goals74. Adversely, the term self-interest bears a particular meaning since it refers to the 
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instrumental attitude that an actor takes toward other actors and toward the established rules or institutions75. Like Jencks, 
Wendt maintained that “egoistic and instrumental attitude” vis-à-vis other actors and toward the rules is the element that 
distinguished self-interest from interest. Egoism and instrumentality imply the idea that the actor’s strategic calculation and 
his perception of his obligations toward other actors are neither moral nor immoral, but rather amoral: they are mere objects 
to be used instrumentally (Wendt 1999, 239). In the case of sanctions for example, saying the EU recognizes the legitimacy 
of the UNSC sanctions, implies a claim that the EU takes for granted the existing structure of relations and institutions 
established by the UN System, that the EU admits that these rules and relations are accepted and not challenged, and that the 
EU is seeking its interest by aiming at improving its position within this framework.
The following paragraphs bring about two different ways in which regional organizations used the legitimacy of the 
UN sanctions to pursue their interests. In the first case, the legitimacy of UN sanctions was considered as a threshold of 
legitimacy which allows for and legitimizes the recourse to unilateral sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals, this was 
precisely the case of the UE. In the second case, the legitimacy of UN sanctions is perceived as a ceiling for legitimacy 
in international relations, and thus, only the UN is eligible to use such measures. This was the case of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) who consistently opposed the use of unilateral sanctions by other states and has, to date, 
refrained from using unilateral sanctions to achieve its own foreign policy goals.
　　2.2.1  UN sanctions’ legitimacy as a threshold for the use of sanctions in IR
The legitimacy of UN sanctions is enshrined in Chapter VII of the Charter-the only exception to the general prohibition 
of the use of force in international relations- according to which the Security Council has the authority to impose universal 
and legally binding sanctions. Biersteker, Tourinho and Eckert argued that the SC sanctions “carry a legitimating power 
for their own”. They assert that such authority is broadly acknowledged by states and other international organizations, and 
that those actors are typically seeking to justify the legitimacy of their unilateral sanctions on the basis of UN sanctions 
(Biersteker et al.2016, 12)76. 
On the other side, the significant development in the use of unilateral sanctions by regional organizations (i.e. outside 
the UN framework) is a relatively new phenomenon. Generally, Charron and Portela  found that regional organizations 
become more willing to use sanctions to achieve strategic goals within their regions outside the UN framework. This is 
particularly true for sanctions imposed by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Arab League (LA) who strove to “take ownership of their security 
governance issues” they yet, they often seek the infliction of UN sanctions in order to universalize and strengthen their own 
sanctions (Charron and Portela 2016, 101)77. Portela, for example, suggested that the EU inflict sanctions before and after the 
UN sanctions in order to protect their own national security (e.g. sanctions against Libya and the former Yugoslavia) (Portela 
2005)78. However, what is interesting here is the self-limiting that some of those organizations are doing. In the terms of 
Hurd (2008) self-restraining or self-limiting is one of the characteristics of a social order built on legitimacy as distinguished 
from an order built on coercion for example, where the actor’s decision is subject to external restraint79. In fact, Charron 
and Portella  suggest that, for the EU “the imposition of UN sanctions constitutes a ‘threshold’ in terms of legitimacy”. 
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Put differently, unlike the United States, for example, whose sanctions arsenal is often ready and easily accessible for 
decision-makers, the EU leaders were often reluctant in taking the lead in the absence of the UNSC mandate because they 
consider the UNSC sanctions as an “enabling condition” for EU sanctions. Thus, the infliction of sanctions by the UNSC 
is regarded as a green light by decision-makers and makes them more willing to take extra-measures80. One evidence of the 
EU prudence lies in the fact that only in the 1990s member states came to agree to use sanctions outside the UN framework. 
This agreement was later institutionalized by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In fact, the founding act of 
the CFSP which is the Treaty on European Union 2010, referred explicitly to the UN Charter measures “the objectives of 
the CFSP include (...) in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter”81. Another evidence is the EU’s 
caution to keep sanctions as targeted as possible and to design it in the same way as UNSC sanctions. In fact, unlike the 
level of severity of US restrictions and the extraterritorial effect of their national law (e.g. Helms-Burton Act of 1996), the 
EU has generally avoided comprehensive measures. In 2004, this tendency was institutionalized by the “Basic Principles on 
The Use of Restrictive Measures” according to which sanction regimes must be designated in a way to inflict harm only on 
individuals and entities whose behavior is violating the law, and must do no harm to innocents. As a consequence, there is no 
current case of EU sanctions or UNSC sanctions that might be labelled as comprehensive regime (Charron and Portela 2016, 
115)82. 
While the EU and other regional organizations such as the AU etc. considered the UNSC’s sanctions as an enabling 
condition to inflict unilateral sanctions, the stance of certain Asian countries and Asian regional organizations such as the 
ASEAN, is totally different. 
　　2.2.2.  UN sanctions’ legitimacy as a threshold for the use of sanctions in IR
The case of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is quite peculiar and worth studying. In fact, since 
its establishment in August 1967, the organization took an adamant position toward the use of sanctions against its members 
and against other states. It was persistent in acting within the institutional bound of the UNSC and opposed the infliction 
of unilateral sanctions by individual states or other regional organizations. Put differently, the ASEAN stance consists of 
invoking UN sanctions in order to ‘delegitimize’ the recourse to unilateral sanctions in IR. and to date, the ASENA has 
never used sanctions of its own, and has publicly denounced Western states’ sanctions. For instance, ASEAN countries were 
the first to oppose EU and US sanctions against Myanmar following the recent grave and systematic violation of human 
rights within the country. This position was equally followed by many international actors including permanent members 
of the SC such as Russia and China, who consider that legitimacy of the use of sanctions in international relations should 
not go beyond the limit of SC measures; in this sense, UN sanctions are regarded as a ceiling of what they consider globally 
legitimate measures (Charron and Portela 2016, 102-118)83. It is worth noting that ASEAN was particularly consistent in 
rejecting unilateral sanctions against Asian countries. An illustrative example here is the refusal of American proposition to 
impose economic sanctions on Burma for the grave violations of human rights in the late 80s and early 90s following the 
repressions of the students uprising in 1988 and other grave violations of human rights (e.g. forced labor)84. The argument 
at the time was that sanctions would not solve the problem and that such measures would be counterproductive and would 
inflict more harm on civilians. At the time, the admission of Burma to the organization had a tremendous impact on its 
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economic and political relations with the EU which has taken tough economic and diplomatic sanctions against Burma. 
Nevertheless, despite their strong opposition to EU and US calls for sanctions, countries members to ASEAN were not 
impervious to the violations happening in Burma. For example, countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines 
criticized human rights violations committed by the regime in Burma, but they remain opposed to sanctions. They justified 
their behavior by the willingness to engage in constructive relations with Burma, i.e. by keeping economic ties while at the 
same time admitting and condemning the violations committed on the Burmese territory, and most importantly, supporting 
the UN diplomatic efforts and endorsing the U.N. Human Rights Commission Resolution regarding human rights conditions 
in Burma (Cleveland 2001, 15)85.
3. Sanctions legitimacy and the quest of effectiveness: the case of individual states
Both states and IOs themselves are aware of the fact that international organizations need states to sustain their actions 
and even to survive. In other words, while contestation of the legitimacy of IOs is very likely to threaten their very existence, 
this hypothesis does not apply to states. Among others, Sadurska and Chinkin highlighted the need of all IOs for the domestic 
administrative organs of states to enforce their decisions. They assert that national administrations of member states provide 
a “life supporting system” to IOs86. Adversely, the existence of states does not really depend that much on legitimacy, even 
though legitimacy of their action plays an important role in their decision-making process (Sadurska and Chinkin 1989, 888). 
Indeed, while IOs have no option but to develop a reputation of compliance with international law and of respect of their 
international obligations87, states still have the option of developing a reputation of being “tough, irrational, isolationist and 
also unpredictable”88. Similarly, Daugirds maintains that the continued existence of IOs depends on their member states, 
which makes the stakes of being perceived as being legitimate, “typically higher” for IOs than for individual states (Daugirds 
2014, 1010)89. So, why would the state choose to join or to remain engaged with IOs?
 Hurd (2008) asserts that states admit the legitimacy of IOs because legitimacy may practically change the rules of the 
game, i.e. the environment of the decision-making for all actors (including those who do not engage with the organization). 
Thus, a simple calculation of costs and benefits would eventually induce states to engage with the organization in order 
to achieve their strategic goals, because the alternative would be more costly90. However, this also means that states, as 
sovereign entities, still enjoy the option of abandoning the organization if they believe that such organization does not offer 
a satisfying tradeoff between multilateralism and other alternatives such as unilateralism91. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 
argued that states are willing to remain members of the IO as long as they have gained from their membership over the long-
haul, otherwise they will simply abandon them (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 768)92. Similarly, Hurrel  says that 
powerful states are looking for institutions that offer them the “best trade-off between effectiveness on the one hand and the 
maximization of control and self-insulation on the other hand”93. Thus, they will obviously have little interest in joining 
or remaining in an institution that does not satisfy such desire. As for the stakes for the less powerful actors, IOs are often 
valued because they help keeping the hegemon at least partially integrated within institutions and within the borders of 
legality (Hurrel 2005, 47)94. 
The first paragraph argues that the judicial challenges targeting the UN sanctions at national and regional courts and 
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the political pressure by other actors such as regional organizations, has jeopardized universal implementation of sanctions, 
and has also emboldened powerful actors such as the US to rely more on unilateralism in the use of sanctions. The second 
paragraph is a case-study of the gradual increasing in the recourse to unilateral sanctions outside the UN framework. It 
underlines the shift in the political rhetoric of US officials regarding UN sanctions and it puts under light the expansion of 
the activities of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) since 2001. 
　3.1.  Ineffective sanctions are deemed illegitimate
 As mentioned in the introduction, the limited effectiveness of UN sanctions was exacerbated after the abandonment 
of the comprehensive sanctions regime following the apocalyptic humanitarian costs of sanctions imposed on Iraq during 
the 1990s. On the one hand, in the current moment, all UN sanctions regimes are targeted regimes (smart sanctions) that 
are addressed to individuals and entities and not to entire societies; this turn has expensive costs in terms of effectiveness 
of such measure and led the UN to gradually losing the cooperation and support of certain member states, especially major 
powers. Bierstecker, for instance, signals the rhetorical trap in which decision-makers fall by advocating for “broader” and 
“crippling” sanctions as a response to the limited effectiveness of targeted sanctions (Bierstecker 2015, 173)95. It is worth 
noting here the phenomenon of seeking effectiveness by imposing blunt comprehensive sanctions instead of a more targeted 
sanctions, falls within what Lopez called “the conventional theory underlying the imposition of sanctionsʺ (i.e. the greater is 
the economic pain caused by sanction on the target, the higher is the political profit for the sender) (Lopez 1997, 327-328) 96. 
Galtung described those comprehensive indiscriminate sanctions as a “naive theory” of sanctions because it assumes that the 
economic hardship will turn the population of the target state against their authoritarian regimes, an argument which proved 
to be invalid in most of the cases (Galtung 1967, 380)97.
On the other hand, the legitimacy of UN sanctions is currently under scrutiny of national and domestic courts (especially 
European courts), and in many instances the listing decisions made by the SC were held to be violating peremptory norms 
of international law and other international standards. As a result, courts ordered the non-implementation of such decisions 
by member states, and the universal implementation of those decisions was seriously hampered. Indeed. according to 
Thouvenin, concerns related to human rights violations and the continuous pressure by judicial organs and civil society 
constitute not only an “impairment” of the efficiency of UN sanctions98, but also, an incentive for some states to use 
sanctions unilaterally: “some actors have a tendency to go back to old methods when they conclude that targeted sanctions 
proved inefficient”. An illustrative example here is the case of American sanctions against Iran, assimilated to “economic 
blockades” (Thouvenin 2015, 128-129)99. 
While legitimation is a process that creates an internalized belief that the rule or the institution ought to be respected, 
delegitimation signals the end of such internalization. Saying that the US internalization of the SC’s legitimate authority to 
ensure international peace and security through the use of restrictive measures other than the use of armed force, requires 
first a definition of what internalization means. Hurd proposed two empirical tests to measure internationalization. Firstly, 
one might say that a process of legitimation occurs when the content of a given rule or the authority of a particular institution 
are taken into consideration by states when they are seeking their interests. Thus, if we scrutinize the state’s behavior 
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when it pursued a certain goal, and found out that established rules and institutions were taken for granted when acting 
instrumentally, that means that the state internalized the belief that the given rule or intuitions is legitimate. Secondly, it is 
possible to say that the process of legitimation occurs when we notice that certain actors attempted to influence other states 
by way of advantages and sources derived from the multilateral institutional environment (Hurd 2008, 32)100. The following 
paragraph is an attempt to capture the US stance vis-à-vis UN sanctions. It aims at underlining the tendency of the US to 
act outside the institutional framework of the organizations and at highlighting the shift in political rhetoric of US officials 
regarding the utility of UN sanctions.
　3.2.  The proliferation of unilateral sanctions: the case of the US
This paragraph argues that over the last two decades, the US tended to achieve its foreign policy goals outside the 
institutional framework of IOs, and that the official stance regarding the effectiveness of UN sanctions has changed 
dramatically.
　 　3.2.1.  The shift of the US foreign policy toward unilateralism
Recalling the above-mentioned argument of Hurrell, the choice by the US to act within the bounds of multilateral 
institutions depends largely on balancing effectiveness and sovereignty. He argued that states, namely the powerful ones, 
are typically seeking the “best trade-off between effectiveness on the one hand and the maximization of control and self-
insulation on the other” (Hurrel 2005, 37)101. Indeed, the fact that the US considers UN sanctions as ineffective, is translated 
into the excessive recourse to unilateral sanctions which have exponentially increased in the last two decades. One can 
argue that the recourse of the US to unilateral sanctions since the end of the Second World War until the early 1990s was not 
related to the limited effectiveness of UN sanctions, but was rather justified by the inability to act through the UNSC (the 
Council was paralyzed by the right to the veto). In fact, following the end of the cold war and the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the SC was unlocked and international cooperation flourished. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, unveiled the fact that the US 
recourse to unilateral sanctions during the 1990s (a.k.a sanctions decade) decreased remarkably: “the extent of international 
cooperation in sanctions episodes increased sharply with the end of the Cold War, and the proportion of unilateral US 
sanctions declined sharply” (Hufbauer et al. 2007, 57)102. 
Nevertheless, Hurrell (2005) argued that the US administration developed a practice of acting outside the 
institutionalized organizational framework bound by international law, and that recent American administrations have sought 
to rely gradually on its national law to achieve its foreign policy objectives. In relation to issues such as the drug and human 
rights, the US uses “certification” to influence other states conduct; for matters related to democracy and nuclear weapons 
the US used tough and far-reaching unilateral sanctions with little space for accountability; finally, even the US domestic 
courts were acting as if they were international courts in some circumstances. Hurrell also recalls Kirsch’s conceptualization 
of “indirect governance” (2003) to denote the US attempts to avoid the limitations that may be imposed by international 
law in areas such as the security regulation, aviation standards and the development of the internet (Hurrel 2005, 38)103. 
Similarly, E.H. Preegg signaled the phenomenon of the increased involvement of US domestic constituencies in the use of 
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sanctions, and affirmed that, mostly, the rise of unilateral actions comes to satisfy such demands (E.H. Preegg 1999)104. Also, 
Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot and Oegg revealed the increased involvement of the US congress and sub-federal players as well 
as NGOs in the imposition of unilateral sanctions on other states, entities and individuals ((Hufbauer et al. 2007, 135)105. 
It is important however, to note that despite the fact that the Trump-era mirrors a backsliding of US priorities and policies 
toward multilateral institutions (e.g. withdrawing from the from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) in October 2017, from the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. Economic and Social 
Council (June 2018), from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (June 2017), from the Open Skies Treaty (May 2020), 
and from the World Trade Organizations (July 2020)), the US attempts to tear off its multilateral obligations and to get 
around the constraints of international law did not come once in the blue night. George W. Bush (2001-2009), for instance, 
withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the statue of the International Criminal Court and even invaded Iraq 
without having authorization from the Security Council in a clear violation of the UN Charter. What is striking with this 
respect is that, even during the presidency of Barack Obama whose administration showed no hostility toward multilateral 
arrangements, the number of unilateral sanctions taken by the OFAC was increasing steadily and progressively. This 
might be sufficient proof that what the US is looking for is effectiveness and that its decision to take more or less sanctions 
depends on the effectiveness of the measures undertaken106. In fact, in a time where the effectiveness of UN sanctions was 
increasingly hampered with around forty legal challenges in domestic and national courts (2008-2018)107, the OFAC actions 
increased tremendously to reach 158 sanctions-related acts in 2019 (compared to 38 actions in 2001)108. At this level,, it is 
worth noting that this shift can be also captured in the public statements of US officials over the last few decades.
　　3.2.2.  The Shift in the political rhetoric vis-à-vis UN sanctions
Almost a decade ago, Morgan and Bapat asserted that multilateral sanctions were typically considered more effective 
and useful than unilateral sanctions: “[p]olicy makers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce 
a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. (…) policy makers often advocate the use of multilateral 
sanctions over unilateral sanctions, arguing that a coalition of states can create stronger signals to a target government 
and impose greater costs if the target does not comply with the senders’ demands”.  In the case of the US, high-ranking 
officials in the US administration such as the former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the former Vice President 
Richard Cheney did not only advocate for the necessity to recourse to multilateral sanctions, but they even admitted publicly 
the limited effectiveness of unilateral sanctions. For example, Condoleezza Rice admitted in 2006 that the unanimous vote 
against North Korea demonstrated the “unity of purpose” and sent a powerful signal to North Korea and would serve as a 
credible and powerful tool to induce it to change its behavior. On the other side, US former vice president Cheney described 
sanctions against Cuba as unwise and declared that unilateral sanctions “almost never work” (Morgan and Bapat 2009, 
1075-1076)109. As for sanctions against Iran and the necessity to act through the Security the Council, the US vice president 
said the following: “[w]hen we impose unilateral sanctions, unless there’s a collective effort, other people move in and take 
advantage of the situation and you don’t have any impact, except to penalize American companies. We’ve got sanctions on 
Iran now. We may well want to go to the UN Security Council and ask for even tougher sanctions if they don’t live up to 
their obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency Non-Proliferation Treaty. We’re working with the Brits and 
the Germans and the French, who’ve been negotiating with the Iranians. We recently were actively involved in a meeting in 
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the International Atomic Energy Agency. There will be a follow-up meeting in November to determine whether or not Iran’s 
living up to their commitments and obligations. And if they aren’t, my guess is then the board of governors will recommend 
sending the whole matter to the UN Security Council for the application of the international sanctions”110. 
Nonetheless, this stance shifted dramatically over the last few years, the statements of the current US president are 
illustrative with this respect. For instance, in December 27th 2016, president Trump described the UN as being “a club for 
people to get together, talk and have a good time”. Later, in an interview in the same year he described the US relation with 
the US as a waste of time and money: “[w]hen do you see the United Nations solving problems? They don’t. They cause 
problems, he said. “[i]f it lives up to its potential, it’s a great thing. And if it doesn’t, it’s a waste of time and money”111. 
Moreover, in her message addressed during the Commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the UN Charter (June 2020), 
the US ambassador to the UN conveys in a very straightforward manner the stance of the US toward the UN. Inter alia, 
she informed the Secretary General and the UN officials that an institution that is not effective should be dissolved: “UN 
institutions that don’t live up to this standard should be reformed or shuttered”; and she asserts that the UN is not responding 
to the aspirations of the international community, and that multilateralism is intended to serve the interest of sovereign states 
and not an aim at itself:  “multilateralism is not an end in itself, but is a tool in hand of sovereign states”. Also, she highlights 
the lack of accountability, transparence, rule of law and the limited efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the UN 
institutions. Not only that, but the US ambassador claimed that ideals of the UN Charter such as HR and dignity etc. were 
inspired by principles and values that animate the founding documents of the US, and affirmed that the US, as a founding 
member of the UN, deserve a transparent, professional, rules-based organization, and is expecting the UN to uphold those 
values112. In brief, the statement of the US ambassador goes in line with the current foreign policy approach of the American 
administration, roughly translated through slogans such as “America first” and “Make America Great Again”. Moreover, an 
illustrative example of the US tendency to shift outside the UN sanction framework is reflected through the recent behavior 
of the US mission within the Security Council113. American Political scientist Paul Poast argued that the “miserable” failure 
of the US draft Resolution at the UNSC (2 yes votes, 2 rejections and 11 abstentions) was actually intentional and goes 
in line with the Trump administration's strategy. Knowing that this is the second time for the US administration to take 
such approach114, Poast argued that prior to 2018, different US administrations used all means-including buying votes and 
manipulating the IMF-to avoid failure in the SC115, and this means that the Trump’s administration was trying to make a: “look 
how much the rest of the world is against us” kind-of-statement, which fits his view that the UN is a useless, and backs his 
America First mentality116. Indeed, a scrutiny of all US-backed resolutions from 1945 to 2015 revealed that failure was very 
rare simply because states, including the US, tend to withdraw draft resolutions that are likely to fail: resolutions likely to 
fail, particularly miserably, are never brought to a vote117. 
Put differently, the US administration under Trump is following the inverse of what is considered to be a conventional 
and orthodox approach of acting through the Security Council. In fact, Paost, Scherz and Zysset (2019), Allen and Yuen 
(2013) as well as Voeten (2005) assert that, by bringing a draft resolution to the UNSC, states seek to acquire the Council’s 
approval because it is considered as a “symbol of legitimacy”118. Voeten, for example, argued that, since the Persian Gulf War, 
states “behaved “as if” it is costly to be unsuccessful in acquiring the legitimacy of the UNSC”. Hence, in order to legitimize 
their own actions, precisely in relation to the use of force, states sought “political reassurance” through the approval of 
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the Council and treated such approval as a means to legitimize their actions119. However, the US’ current approach seems 
to dismiss such legitimacy and to seek the disapproval of the Council rather than its approval. The disapproval of the SC 
here seems to serve the intention of the US to act unilaterally. For example, the US secretary of state, described the SC 
refusal to approve the draft as inexcusable, while Ambassador Craft said that her 'patience is running very thin' and that the 
US will act unilaterally using all means to extend the embargo on Iran: “[i]n the coming days, the United States will follow 
through on that promise to stop at nothing to extend the arms embargo”120. Those statements reaffirm the analysis of Poast 
who considered that the vote on the draft resolution comes in line with the Trump administration approach to the SC and 
the message that it conveys to different audiences is likely to be the exact message the administration wants to send (Poast 
2020)121. 
Though the limited effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions constitutes an important incentive for states to act unilaterally, 
the recourse to the use of sanctions without having the authorization of the UNSC has become a widespread phenomenon. 
Unlike powerful states such as the US, states with limited economic capabilities and relatively small political weight may 
have different motives to act outside the UNSC framework. The following paragraph is an attempt to explain their behavior 
and to underline the effect of such phenomenon on the international order as a whole.
3. Centralized sanction, decentralized sanctions and the World Order
Undoubtedly, the proliferation of unilateral sanctions constitutes an emergent and notable development in the landscape 
of sanctions122. One may say that pulling the rug from under the feet of the UNSC as the only legitimate authority who 
is entitled to use force in order to enforce the values and objectives of the Charter, is likely to have considerable effects 
on the structure of the international legal order. Structural change is likely to be crystallized by a change in the way the 
international society is organized and compliance with international norms is generated. Hurrell has already signaled the 
deformed character of the contemporary world order and argued that deformity is one of the sources that make legitimacy 
problematic on the international level. By deformity he meant that pre-World Wars order did not vanish by the arrangements 
made after the Second World War but was rather camouflaged. He also, argued that the tendency to act unilaterally, which is 
often illegal, and the inaptitude of international institutions to constrain such acts, are aspects of this deformed character of 
the world order: “deformity is evident in the limited capacity of the international law and institutions to constrain effectively 
the unilateral and often illegal acts of the strong. In this sense we are moving not beyond sovereignty but rather returning to 
an earlier world of differentiated and more conditional sovereignties” (Hurrell 2005, 57)123. The following paragraphs will 
attempt to underline some features of the current world order, provide a possible explanation for the recourse of small states 
to the use of unilateral sanctions, and examine the possible alternatives of a legitimacy-based social order.
4. Centralized sanction, decentralized sanctions and the World Order
　4.1.  The centralization of the use of force in the post-World War Order
The international order established after the end of the Second World War and crowned with the establishment of the 
UN, was mainly founded on a general prohibition of the use of force in international relations (IR). According to Brunnée 
　　（イレフ・メフルズィ）論文　　制裁措置の正当性の主観性―なぜ単独制裁が増加しているか？
173
and Toope, Article 2(4) of the Charter established a sweeping prohibition of the use of force in IR, and constitutes the core 
of the structure of contemporary international society. They affirm that such a primary rule has two exceptions: the first is 
the collective security framework (Chapter VII’s collective security), the second is self-defense (article 51) (Brunnée and 
Toope 2009, 18)124.  Indeed, Chapter VII of the Charter comes to “centralize” the use of force by giving the SC a broad and 
exclusive authority in matters related to breaches of or threats to international peace and security and acts of aggression125. 
That means that, on the one hand, that the SC is entitled with the power to determine and authorize the recourse to armed or 
non-armed force (measures not involving the use of armed-force). On the other hand, it means that states cannot resort to the 
use of force without having an authorization from the SC.
Orakhelashvili argued that unilateral sanctions, precisely those used by regional organizations such as the European 
Union, lack “legal and constitutional justifications”, and are very likely jeopardizing and hijacking the universal framework 
of peace and security established by the UN Charter. On the one hand, he argued that the UNSC legal legitimacy stems from 
the “pattern of ordering” provided by the Charter. Firstly, sanctions must be adopted by the SC-the organ that is charged 
by the Charter and is intended to secure broader compliance. Secondly, the rationale behind the use of sanctions in IR is 
to produce a “strangling and isolating” effect on the target without leaving an option to find alternative partners to escape 
sanctions. Thirdly and finally, the international responsibility of states will be precluded and they will be immune from 
legal claims of the target (Article 103 of the Charter). All in all, the operation of this “complex arrangement” settled by the 
Charter, depends on the presence of all these three elements. It is thus obvious that unilateral sanctions imposed do not fit 
such a pattern and are at best, lacking legal and constitutional basis. On the other hand, he stressed the effects of unilateral 
measures on the functioning and the effectiveness of the multilateral framework established by the Charter: [t]here is every 
reason to suppose that a policy and agenda adopted by a limited number of States as an alternative to that adopted by a 
universal organization risks hijacking the universal organization’s efforts, entails the duality of policies in relation to the 
relevant crisis, and is therefore destructive of the effectiveness of the entire policy underlying the response to the crisis. As 
an evidence, Orakhelashvili draws comparison with the collapse of the League of Nations during the interwar period. At the 
time the League acted in concert and imposed sanctions on Italy, yet the secret engagement of France and UK with Italy in 
the Hoare-Laval Plan, undermined the League’s efforts. Even though the Plan was aborted and the British Foreign Secretary 
had to resign, its overall effects were devastating because the Plan was conceived as a “breach of faith toward the League 
of Nations and its members, a source of relief in Germany, and the unmistakable indication that “the effect on the members 
of the League and on their capacity for collective resistance to aggression was still more crushing”. Similarly, to what 
is noted in the previous paragraphs, he affirmed that EU unilateral sanctions against Iran and Syria, as well as the recent 
developments led by the Kadi decision, are jeopardizing the role of the UN and the effectiveness of its collective security 
framework. On the one hand, those developments are likely to confuse target states/actors (i.e. in terms of what it is expected 
from them) and damaging the “uniform vision within the international society” (what is the message signaled through the use 
of sanctions). On the other hand, the long-term consequences are likely to erode the entire normative framework of the use 
of sanctions, i.e. undermining the “consistent normative basis on which the UNSC can properly calculate cause of action, 
necessity and proportionality of future measures” (Orakhelashvili 2015)126.
At this level, it is necessary to admit that regardless of their disputable legal and constitutional basis, and despite their 
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potential negative effects on the UN efforts, unilateral sanctions are gaining the ground and are becoming the tool of choice 
even for relatively small states. 
　4.2.  The decentralization of the recourse to sanctions in IR
The use of unilateral sanctions, precisely those aimed at the protection of human rights, has become a universal 
phenomenon involving various states- even those who have a small economic capacity and a political weight. Inter alia, 
in early July 2020, the UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab announced that the government will be introducing its first 
human rights sanctions (‘autonomous designation’) before July 2020. Also, Switzerland, which is not a member of the 
European Union has its share of sanctions. For instance, in June 2020, the country-imposed asset freeze and travel ban on 
6 Nicaraguan officials for ‘on-going violation of Human rights, democracy and the rule of law’. Equally, other European 
states non-members of the European Union are getting involved in the EU sanctions, for instance, North Macedonia, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Albania, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are now imposing sanctions on Syria 
and Nicaragua. Finally, many Australian and Canadian Politicians are increasingly invoking the imposition of Magnitsky 
sanctions on officials from China and Hong Kong (for instance last June 12 Senators addressed a letter to Prime Minister 
Trudeau calling for such sanctions)127. 
MacAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (MTT) used certification/decertification as synonyms of legitimacy/illegitimacy128. In 
the context of contentious politics, processes of certification or decertification, are a powerful mechanism that shapes the 
way actors make their claims, and that may produce changes both at the micro-level and macro-level129. The process of 
certification, for instance, provides the actors with stability, intelligibility and, most importantly, recognition. Precisely, 
certification refers to the validation of actors' performances and their claims by external authorities, while decertification 
connotes the withdrawal of such validation. They argue that such processes depend on the existence of a previously 
established conceptions of valid political actors as well as the existence of models, stories and practices associated with 
previous episodes130. In the context of sanctions, the concept of certification may explain the decision of small and relatively 
weak states such as Liechtenstein, or Albania to inflict unilateral sanctions outside the UN mandate. MTT argued that 
certification and recognition are closely related, and that processes of certification often imply an unfortunate psychological 
dimension: certification is chiefly a way to satisfy a psychological need131. They assert that certification processes in IR 
have at stake more than the mere national self-satisfaction but most importantly the recognition from its international 
environment (MacAdam et al. 2001). The work of Swedish political scientist Erik Ringmar is illustrative with this respect. 
Ringmar accentuated the social character of identities in order to explain why a weak and marginal country located in 
Northern Europe (Sweden) dragged itself into the Thirty Years' War and invaded the Roman Empire, even though such war 
was primarily fought in Central Europe (1630). For the authors, this behavior is due to the relational character of identity, 
he argued that actors are not the sole determinant of their own identity: “people alone cannot decide who or what they are, 
but any such decision is always taken together with others. We need recognition for the persons we take ourselves to be, and 
only as recognized can we conclusively come to establish an identity. The quest for recognition will consequently come to 
occupy much of the time of people or groups who are uncertain regarding who they are. We all want to be taken seriously 
and be treated with respect; we all want to be recognized as the kinds of persons we claim to be. Yet recognition is rarely 
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automatic and before we gain it, we are often required to prove that our interpretations of ourselves indeed do fit us. In order 
to provide such proof, we are often forced to act – we must fight in order to convince people regarding the applicability of 
our self-descriptions” (Erik Ringmar 2007, 13-14)132. 
Nevertheless, this decision to enter the war which was primarily driven by selfish and limited motives (recognition 
and self-identification) had long-term and far-reaching effects on the world order as a whole. In fact, the Swedish 
intervention (1630-1635) was a major turning point in the war because the invasion of the Roman Empire had not only 
changed the direction of conflict and made Sweden one of the great powers in Europe for almost a century, but had also 
more fundamental and long-term political consequences: it triggered one of the most important structural changes in the 
international legal order (The Peace of Westphalia 1648)133. Indeed, the Treaties of Westphalia did not only offer Sweden the 
long-wanted diplomatic credibility, but also established a new category of international actors: Equally Sovereign States. On 
the one hand, those treaties led to the transformation of the international society into a Club of States comes along with the 
delegitimation of the Empire as a form of political arrangement134. On the other hand, it changed the face of the international 
society forever by marking the beginning of certification/ decertification processes of who is eligible to be called a state 
and who is not, not only in Europe but in the entire globe: “a new set of powers were established, constituting both the 
certified major actors on the European scene and, collectively, the certifiers of arrivals and departures on the scene. For two 
centuries thereafter, successors of those powers continued the process of certification, and eventually extended it to all the 
world’s states”  (MacAdam et al. 2001, 146)135.
The next paragraph argues that the current world order established in the aftermath of the Second World War, is primarily 
a legitimacy-based order. It also underlines the other possible alternative of the current model: a coercion-based order and a 
self-interest-based order.
　4.3.  The alternatives to a legitimacy-based World Order: legitimacy, coercion and self-interest
A legitimacy-based social order, is an order where different actors (subjects to this order) believe that the rules and 
institutions of such order “ought to be respected and deserve their deference”. Indeed, the idea that the post-World Wars 
order is a legitimacy-based order is well established within the political, legal and philosophical debate136. It is generally 
admitted that the end of the Second World War established a new legitimacy-based order crystalized through a continuous 
process of legitimation of the United Nations’ Security Council137. For instance, scholars of international law often argue 
that the law that regulates international society is mostly respected138. Inter alia, in his book entitled How Nations Behave, 
renewed American legal scholar Louis Henkin wrote: “[a]lmost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all the time”139. 
AT this level, it is necessary to note that there are two other possible alternatives for a legitimacy-based social order: 
the first is coercion and the second is self-interest. Indeed, Hurd conceptualized three modes of social control: legitimacy, 
(pure) self-interest and coercion (he also called them “ideal-types” and “grand concepts of sociology”)140. He said that 
each mode has different mechanisms to generate compliance of actors with the agreed-upon rules within a given society, 
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i.e. a legitimacy-based social order is distinctive in terms of the behavioral and structural outcomes it entails, from an order 
that is based on coercion or on pure-self-interest141. On the one side, coercion is defined as a “relation of asymmetrical 
physical power among agents''; it is an imbalanced relationship that aims at changing the behavior of the weaker party. 
Hence, in a social system that relies primarily on coercion (e.g. the Hobbesian model), it is fear and compulsion that produce 
acquiescence and obedience. Finally, such order is founded on both “threat” and “force” (i.e. what motivated the ruled 
party is the threat of sanction, and what guaranteed the stability of the order is the absolute power of the ruler). Contrary, 
the operative mechanism in legitimacy resides within the process of internalization of “external standards” by the actor. 
Ironically, experience proved that coercion and repression are both insufficient, often backfire and produce resistance and 
indignation, and that coercion and sanctions are both too costly to maintain social control, and to achieve a stable social 
order142. On the other side, a self-interest-based order, is grounded in the Kantian idea of “peaceful society”143. In such 
order, actors believe that compliance with the rule is more likely to maximize their interests, and that the decision to follow 
the rule is the outcome of a rational calculation of benefits and potential losses (i.e. an instrumental assessment of both 
acts of compliance and of noncompliance). Within this order, the ruler plays the role of a regulator: his mission consists of 
guaranteeing that the act of compliance would be the “most rationally attractive option”. The distinction between legitimacy 
and self-interest lies mainly in the distinction between interest and self-interest, because self-interest implies an instrumental 
attitude vis-à-vis the rules and other actors144. It is, of course, necessary to acknowledge that all the three modes/ideal types 
are entangled. For instance, what gathers self-interest and legitimacy, is the fact that the behavior of the actor is the result of 
his self-restraint (in a coercive order his act is generated by an external restraint). Also, all the three ideal-types are similar 
in that they all maintain that states are pursuing something: a goal145. Additionally, both self-interest and coercion emerged 
within the utilitarian tradition and both approaches involve mechanisms that are used to predict and compare the benefit that 
may result from different options, be it the result of a threat or a choice that is manipulated by other actors146. Finally, in a 
coercion-based order and in an order that is based on self-interest, the decision to comply with the rule is the outcome of an 
act of prudence147 (the difference lies in the impact on the actor) (Hurd 2008, 37-40)148. 
Therefore, it would not be plausible to say that the international legal order established after the end of the Second 
World War and institutionalized with the creation of the UN, was entirely a legitimacy-based order. On the contrary, every 
social order encompasses all the three modes, yet what makes difference is the prevailing mode.  Tilly, for instance, argued 
that almost all modern liberal democratic states were legitimated by coercive means, and so are the most legitimate social 
relations (Tilly 1992, 5)149. Hurd in turn, stressed the complexity of the relationship between coercion, self-interest and 
legitimacy, and asserted that almost none of those modes exist in a pure and isolated from150. In his book After anarchy: 
legitimacy and power in the United Nations Security Council, he denotes a world where the power and the legitimacy of 
the UNSC plays a central role. He assumes that the very existence of an authoritative institution such as the Council, puts 
constraints on states interactions and refutes the international anarchy thesis151. According to American political scientist 
Helen Milner (1991), the classical understanding of anarchy in IR scholarship refers to the absence of a centralized authority 
at the international level152. It means also that, while anarchy and authority are mutually exclusive, legitimacy and authority 
are complementary153. Put differently, saying that the UNSC action under Chapter VII is legitimate, and that the Council has 
the power and authority in matters related to the use of sanctions in IR154. For Hurd, the legitimate authority of the Council 
within the international society precludes the anarchic characterization of IR. (Hurd 2008)
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 However, and regrettably, with the growing persistence of national and domestic jurisdictions to evaluate the SC’s 
‘sanctions decisions and to declare it invalid for violating of international law; the development of a new phenomenon of 
disobedience among European countries pressed by national courts155; the continuous contestation of sanctions legitimacy 
by political actors for not being not effective; the tremendous proliferation of unilateral sanctions and the limited options 
available to hold the sender accountable156; and the vulnerability of different sanctions regimes and the ad hoc and 
incremental approach of the Council to respond to allegation contesting the legitimacy of its actions157, it is hard to deny that 
the Council’s legitimacy, and a fortiori its authority are declining, and it’s inevitable to say that all those alarming signals are 
evidence that the future of sanctions’ practice is grim.
5. Conclusion
This paper underlined the legitimacy of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council under the provisions 
of Chapter VII of the Charter. The phenomenon in question lies within the intersection between legality and international 
politics. On the one hand, the Council has a hybrid158 character i.e. it is an entity that is both legal and political, and its 
recourse to the use of sanctions is a “matter of politics as much as law” (Cokayne et al. 2018, 7)159. On the other hand, 
legitimacy is “fundamentally understood as a subjective belief that travels across diverse political settings”, and that is 
partly contingent upon the respect of established norms and rules. 
The first part, distinguished multilateral sanctions from unilateral sanctions. The distinction has normative rather than 
a descriptive criterion, that is, regardless of the scope of the measures undertaken and of the number of actors, multilateral 
sanctions are legally defined as sanctions imposed by the SC or basing on authorization from the SC, while unilateral 
sanctions is a residual category that encompasses all similar measures. Accordingly, sanctions imposed by international 
regional organizations such as the European Union or the African Union falls within the category of unilateral sanctions. It 
also highlighted the confusion that mars the concept of legitimacy, exposed the way the concept is understood in different 
disciplines and adopts an operational definition that may serve the purpose of this paper. Legitimacy here is treated as a 
“subjective belief that influences the actors’ behavior and their understanding of what constitutes an interest for them”. 
However, this belief is partly dependent on respect for international norms and standards. Finally, this paragraph traces 
different phases of questioning and challenging the legitimacy of UN sanctions.  
The second part examined the way the EU comprehends the legitimacy of the SC sanctions in the light of the broad 
concept of “interest”. It shows that the organization is a double-hatted actor. On the one hand it admits the legitimacy of the 
SC authority to inflict sanctions and considers the presence of UN sanctions as a “threshold” of legitimacy to impose their 
own unilateral sanctions. On the other hand, it plays a key role in controlling and challenging the legitimacy of sanctions for 
violation of international norms and standards, namely those in relation to the respect of due process guarantees and human 
rights. National and regional courts took the lead in exercising this control which had a serious effect on the effectiveness 
and the universal application of UN sanctions. 
Contrary to the EU, other regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and some other 
European countries, admits the legitimacy of the SC authority to impose sanctions and considers such legitimacy as a “ceiling” 
of legitimacy and considers unilateral sanctions as illegal measures.  
The third part put under light the behavior of powerful states such as the US. It argued that the issue of effectiveness 
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of UN sanctions prevailed over the US stance vis-à-vis the legitimacy of sanctions. Firstly, it stressed the decline of 
the effectiveness of UN sanctions resulting from the shift of the UN toward the use of targeted sanctions, and from the 
persistence of national and regional courts (especially EU courts) to review and preclude the validity of the UN sanctions. It 
is thus argued that the limited effectiveness contributed to the proliferation of the US unilateral sanctions and led to a shift in 
the US position toward the UNSC and its ability to maintain and fulfil the expectation of member states and the requirements 
of the charter.  
The fourth and final part underscores the phenomenon of the proliferation of unilateral sanctions imposed by both states 
and regional organizations without having the authorization of the council. Firstly, it examines the proliferation of unilateral 
sanctions in the light of the overall framework of the use of force in international relations. Secondly, it attempts to explain 
the behavior of smaller states who also want to take their share of unilateral sanctions. Thirdly and finally, it highlights the 
possible alternatives of a legitimacy-based international order (i.e. an order that is primarily based on “pure” self-interest, or 
a Hobbesian order that is governed by coercion). Ultimately, it should be noted that this dramatic change in the landscape of 
the use of sanctions in international relations creates new challenges: what criterion should be used to draw the line between 
unilateral sanctions aiming at upholding human rights and preserving international peace and security and those seeking 
restraint national interests? How could we hold states accountable for damages caused by sanctions and how to preserve 
the rights of those affected especially when sanctions are broad and far-reaching? What is the effect of the proliferation of 
unilateral sanctions on the peace and security framework established by the UN Charter? Before answering these questions, 
we need first to account for the legitimacy and the legality of unilateral sanctions. 
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